북한 핵 키워드

HEU

2010-06-13T23:28:00.001-07:00

최근 언론에 농축우라늄(HEU)라는 용어가 심심치 않게 등장하고 있다. 하나는 19일 교도통신의 보도인데, 북경에서 있었던 2.13 합의 당시에 문안에 이 ‘농축우라늄 프로그램’ 문제를 명시하는 문제를 놓고 힘겨루기가 있었고 당시 송민순 외교통상부장관이 라이스 미 국부부 장관과 전화통화를 해서 HEU를 넣지 않기로 했다는 내용이고, 다른 하나는 20일 국회 정보위원회에서 정보 당국자가 “북한에 HEU프로그램이 있다”고 밝혔다는 내용이다.

▲ 왜 농축 우라늄인가?

이 문제의 연원을 따져보면 지난 1999년으로 거슬러 올라간다. 지난 99년 3월, 워싱턴 타임즈는 “북한이 우라늄 농축 기술을 파키스탄으로부터 지원 받고 있으며, 우라늄 농축을 위한 원심분리기 관련 품목을 발주한 것을 포착 했다”고 보도했다. 그리고 2002년 10월 3일 켈리 미국측 특사가 방북했을 때, 북한은 우라늄 농축프로그램을 보유했다는 사실을 시인함으로써 이른바 <2차 핵 위기>가 발생했다.

당시 북한은 10.25 외무성 대변인 담화를 통해, “우리는 미국 대통령 특사에게 미국의 가중되는 핵 압살 위협에 대처하여 우리가 자주권과 생존권을 지키기 위해 핵무기는 물론 그보다 더한 것도 가지게 되어 있다는 것을 명백히 말해 주었음"이라고 밝혔다.

그렇다면 농축우라늄은 무엇이고 왜 문제가 되는 것일까? 우선 요약하자면 농축우라늄은 ①원자폭탄의 원료가 되고 ②농축장비를 일단 갖출 경우, 생산과정을 포착하기 어려우며 ③우라늄이 농축만 되면 플루토늄보다 간단한 구조로 폭탄을 만들 수 있기 때문이다.

▲ 플루토늄탄 vs 우라늄탄

원자폭탄은 핵물질의 종류, 에너지를 발생시키는 방식 등 여러 가지 잣대로 구분을 해 볼 수 있는데, 원자폭탄의 재료 - 그러니까 핵물질의 종류에 따라 구분을 하자면 플루토늄탄과 우라늄탄으로 나눠볼 수 있다. 2차대전 당시 히로시마와 나가사키에 떨어진 원자폭탄도 하나는 우라늄탄, 하나는 플루토늄탄이었다.

플루토늄은 자연에는 존재하지 않고, 원자로 내에서 <우라늄 238>이 중성자를 흡수해서 만들어지는 인공핵종(人工核種)인데, 북한은 영변지역에 있는 5메가와트짜리 흑연감속로의 연료봉을 재처리하는 과정을 거쳐서 이 플루토늄을 생산했다. 이 원자로는 한 번에 약 8천개, 50톤 분량의 핵연료봉을 장전하고, 사용한 핵연료의 재처리를 통해 10에서 12kg의 핵무기용 플루토늄을 생산할 수 있다고 한다. 원자폭탄 한 개에 들어가는 플루토늄은 대개 6에서 8kg정도이다.

플루토늄 원자폭탄은 제대로 터뜨리기가 힘든 폭탄이다. 정확한 비유는 아니지만 고무풍선에 바람을 넣다 보면 어느 순간에 폭발하는 것처럼, 원자폭탄에 있어선 핵 물질이 어떤 <임계질량>에 도달하도록 해줘야 폭발을 시킬 수 있다. 그런데 플루토늄은 재료의 특성상 엄청난 압력을 견딜 수 있도록 만들어진 밀폐된 폭탄 안에 16개, 32개 이런 식으로 금속 플루토늄 조각을 여러 개로 분리해 놓고, 100만분의 1초의 정밀도로 작동하게끔 배치된 고성능 폭약을 터뜨려 순간적으로 뭉치게 만들어야만 터뜨릴 수 있다. 이걸 전문 용어로 “내폭형 기폭장치”라고 부르는데, 쉽지 않은 기술이고 그래서 1-2번의 시험으로 원자폭탄을 성공시켜 실제 무기로 쓸 수 있는 형태로 만든 나라는 이 세상 어디에도 없다. 미국의 경우에도 나가사키에 떨어뜨린 플루토늄탄의 경우 불발을 우려해 똑같은 폭탄을 하나 더 만들고 먼저 시험해 본 다음 실전에 썼다고 한다.

반면에 우라늄탄은 플루토늄탄과는 달리 터뜨리기가 쉽다. ‘포신형 기폭장치’라고 해서 그냥 고농축 우라늄을 두 개로 나눠놨다가 고성능 폭약으로 2개가 합쳐지게, 초임계 상태로 도달하게 만들어 주기만 하면 되는 것이다. 이 포신형 기폭장치는 고농축 우라늄만 있으면 비교적 쉽게 만들 수가 있고, 아까 언급했던 것처럼 폭발 확률이 아주 높기 때문에 별도의 핵실험을 하지 않아도 된다는 장점이 있다. 북한의 입장에선, 가질 수만 있다면 우라늄탄을 갖는 것이 플루토늄탄보다 훨씬 장점이 많은 셈이다.

▲ 농축우라늄 제조과정

우라늄을 농축하는 방법은 여러 가지가 있는데, 그 중에서 지금 문제가 되고 있는 방식은 ‘원심분리’방식. 시험관에다 비중(比重)이 다른 2가지 액체를 섞어 채워놓고 줄을 묶어서 빙빙 돌리면 상대적으로 무거운 액체가 바깥쪽에, 가벼운 액체는 안쪽에 이렇게 분리가 되는 원리를 이용한 것이다. 필요한 건 우라늄238인데, 우라늄 235와 섞여있는 재료를 특수 제작된 회전원통 속에 넣고 아주 고속으로(4-7만rpm) 돌려주는 과정을 반복해서 순도 높은 우라늄 238을 분리해 내는 방식.

이 원심분리기는 크기가 상대적으로 작고 분산배치가 가능하기 때문에 첩보위성만으로는 발견하기가 어렵다. 또, 북한의 우라늄 매장량은 약 2,600만 톤에 달하며, 이 가운데 캐낼 수 있는 매장량이 약 400만 톤으로 알려지고 있다. 어떻게 보면 이보다 더 좋은 해법은 없을 것 같은데 문제는 이런 원심분리 장치를 마련한다는 것이 쉬운 일이 아니라는 것.

일단 원심분리장치를 구성하고 있는 기술 자체가 최첨단 기술이라는 점. 강한 회전력을 가진 소형펌프, 진동방지기술, 고강도 알루미늄강 등의 값비싼 자재들이 필요한데, 대부분 북한 자체적으로 생산이 불가능한 것들이다. 원심분리기 1세트의 가격이 약 16에서 24만 달러에 달한다고 계산이 나올 정도다. <포신형 우라늄 핵무기>의 경우 50kg정도의 핵무기급 우라늄이 필요한데, 이 정도 양이라면 1,700여기의 원심분리기를 1년간 가동해야 한다고 하니, 엄청난 자본이 투자가 돼야 가능한 일인 것.

▲ 농축우라늄에 ‘프로그램’이란 단어가 붙는 이유는?

2.13 합의문, 나아가 2005년 9.19 공동성명에도 ‘핵 프로그램’이라는 단어가 등장한다. 어떤 사정이 있었는지, 정말 교토통신의 보도처럼 송민순 외교부 장관과 라이스 장관이 HEU를 명시하는 것을 양보한 것인지 확인할 수 없지만, 한 가지 분명한 것은 “핵 프로그램”이라는 용어에는 농축우라늄 문제에 대해서도 북한이 분명한 해법을 내놔야 한다는 의미가 담겨있다는 점이다.

이춘근의 저서 <북한핵>에 따르면, 북한은 제 3차 7개년 계획(1987-1993)기간에 레이저법에 의한 우라늄 농축기술을 연구한 바 있다고 한다. 이건 원심분리법과는 다른 방식인데, 기술적인 제약이나 고가의 설비 반입이 불가능했기 때문에 성공하지 못한 것으로 판단하고 있다. 이어 북한은 파키스탄에서 원심분리기 도입을 시도했고, 알루미늄 튜브, 우라늄 주입, 회수장치 등을 구입했다는 사실이 미국과 우리나라 정보당국에 의해 파악된 것으로 알려지기도 했다. 또 2004년 2월에는 파키스탄의 유명한 핵물리학자인 칸 박사가 “우라늄 농축을 위한 재료, 설계, 기술이 북한에 이전됐다”고 언급한 바 있다. 정부당국자에 따르면, 몇 년 전에도 북한은 독일 등으로부터 고강도 알루미늄 관을 수입하려다 이 계획이 적발돼 차단된 적이 있다고 한다.

“프로그램”이라는 말이 붙은 이유는 이렇다. 북한이 우라늄 농축을 시도하려 하는 것은 어찌 보면 분명해 보이는데, 그게 미수에 그친 일이건 일부 진행이 됐건, 적어도 몇 세트 정도는 가동이 됐던 간에 그 전모를 밝혀야 한다는 의미인 것.

6자회담에 정통한 서울의 한 소식통은 “앞으로 만들어지고 가동될 비핵화 실무그룹에서 이 HEU문제가 쟁점이 될 것인데, 이른바 HEU 프로그램에 대해 북한과 나머지 나라들이 이해하는 방법이 달라서 문제가 생길 수 있다.”고 귀띔했다.

2.13 합의문 II-2는 다음과 같다. “조선민주주의인민공화국은 9.19 공동성명에 따라 포기하도록 되어있는, 사용 후 연료봉으로부터 추출된 플루토늄을 포함한 공동성명에 명기된 모든 핵 프로그램의 목록을 여타 참가국들과 협의한다.” 바로 이 핵 프로그램 목록에 대한 협의, 다르게 말하면 HEU 프로그램을 어떻게 하느냐가 앞으로 짧으면 2달, 혹 1년여의 시간계획을 갖고 진행될 비핵화 절차의 핵심 중에 핵심이라 할 것이다.

참조 : [과학기술로 읽는 북한 핵], 이춘근, 생각의 나무
[대량살상무기 문답백과], 국방부, 행정간행물

Kim-jungil's Reply ; Is it Neutral signal?

2007-12-14T19:46:00.000-08:00

Today...
There was a party at the State department.
At there I met someone very important official who works for state department.
And I asked him.
"How do you evaluate the reply from DPRK (North Korea).
Is it positive one or negative one?"
He answered "Neutral!"

Embassador Christopher Hill had been to DPRK early December.
He handed a letter from G.Bush ; president of U.S. to DPRK's official.
And last Tuesday, there was an answer through Newyork cannel ;
State Department confirmed that fact today.

But I don't think it's nuetral. Rather Negative.....
Because,
1) After reply, Bush did not seem to content the message.
- What he said in the pressconference was, "DPRK mush do full and clear declaration."
2) Also there's no good news till now that 6-party talks will start within December.

I met another offical. And said to her that "Maybe.. DPRK will not abandon 'the policy of vague' ,
so it will be very difficult to do a full and clear declaration."
She said... "I know, but it's important to keep trying."

Couple of days ago Embassador Chun-yongwoo met Woodawai (Chinese top official concerning 6 party talks) and, Woodawai are going to visit DPRK next week.

It is true that it's not the end of the process...
But.. I think within a couple of weeks,
the short term direction of denuclearization process will be settle down.

In Washington D.C. , it's not too cold yet.
But, it could be turn to freezing cold winter.

2006-12-12T16:56:00.000-08:00

Amb. Chun yungwoo
Special Representative for Korean Peninsula Peace and Security Affairs Head of 6-party talks.
speech in

It’s a great pleasure to speak to such wisemen on subjects of great interest. I don’t think such a gathering can be better timed than now since we have only a few days to go until the next round of 6p talks.
I must say in advance that this isn’t a press conference so I’m ,it’s my understanding that gentlemen’s house rules apply to this session and I hope I will not be quoted out of context.
I’ll give a brief overview of where we stand now, why nkorea clinging on to nuke ambitions, what are challenges ahead, are there still chances for diplomatic resolution and what will it take to make progress at next round of the 6p talks…. There have been many twists and turns in the north korean nuke issue sine the Geneva Agreed Framework fell apart four years ago, culminating in north korea’s nuclear test on oct 9 and adoption of UN security council resolution 1718 two weeks later. The good news is that now that the vicious cycle of negative dynamics surrounding the north Korean nuclear issue has run its course, it’s time to reverse the four-year slide and move forward on the path to denuclearization. As announced by china yesterday, the 6party talks will reconvene and we look forward to some real progress on the implementation of the 919 agreement in the next round of six-party talks.
We’ve seen enough commitments thus far and it’s time to translate them into concrete action. I couldn’t earn my bread for the past 9 months, So I have to make up for the lost bread I had to earn. Let me start with how I see nkorea’s motivations in clinging to its ambitions, what their game plan is. North korea is faced with an existential crisis. It has no allies to rely upon in a time of crisis. While it’s conventional armament becoming obsolete it has no money to compete with the South in a conventional arms race. It sees itself, in my view, as being besieged, squeezed, strangled and cornered by hostile powers while languishing in abject poverty with no end or turnaround in sight. According to own statistics, North Korea’s per capita GDP in 2001 stood at $478, and I’m sure that was based on official exchange rate, which is a small fraction of the black market rate.
It continues to depend on international life-support system and for its very subsistence. And desperately standing on the edge, it’s playing a dangerous survival game. Nuclear capabilities occupy central place in this game. For the north korean leaders, nuclear weapons provide the only deterrent against external threats and thus the ultimate insurance policy for national security in an increasingly hostile world.
And since nuclear capabilities are the only source of leverage in Pyongyang’s hand and given the amount of resources they have invested in them at the expense development, they won’t give them up unless a credible alternative is on offer that can resolve all their existential problems, both security and economic, or their insurance premium becomes more costly than the disaster to be insured against. This means that pyeongyang will resort to all kinds of games they know, they’ve worked before, and that a weak party can play in an unequal bargaining situation with the only superpower on earth.
It will be no surprise if they come up with outrageous demands, taking a maximalist approach, resorting to brinkmanship, salami tactics or any other tactics, if they believe it helps to elicit a alternative insurance policy as good as nuclear weapons. From such behavior, we should guard against jumping to the conclusion that they have no intention of giving up their nuclear ambitions. They have little margin of error in their judgement of action. For North Korea, one wrong step on the way could lead tem down a fatal slippery slope toward their own demise. North Korea believes that they have no remedy if the US backs out of its commitments.
This means that flexibility or a spirit of compromise will be the last thing we can expect from them. The North korean leaders know how weak, isolated and vulnerable their country is despite their nuclear capabilities. And as way of covering up weakness and vulnerability, they would not go out of their way to demonstrate how resolutely they can stand up to outside pressure. I’m inclined to see their missile and nuclear tests as well.
They’ll try to delay nuclear dismantlement until they can trust the US commitment to a peaceful coexistence and they are promised an attractive economic and energy assistance package. At the same time, north korea will be tempted to keep a back door to future proliferation open by maintaining their clandestine uranium enrichment program intact. If the northkorean leadership concludes that a deal they can live with is beyond reach, their likely option would be to hunker down, dig in further, muddle through until after the next presidential election in the U.S. I would not exclude the possibility that they’ll go back to the path of building up their nuclear capabilities, including through the resumption of missile and nuclear testing.
Having given you such a green picture of the situation, u might wonder if there are still chances for diplomatic resolution to the issue? I believe there are some grounds to believe that diplomatic resolution is still possible. First, the options open to north korea are very limited. Another nuclear test will only invite addition Security council sanctions far more biting than those already in place. Although we know how determined and resilient north korea is in standing up to outside pressure, I think it would be extremely difficult for them to survive tightened sanctions they are to face in the event that they opt for another test.
Another cause for cautious hope lies ironically now is north korea’s dire economic situation and inability to jumpstart its economic machine on its own without outside assistance. As unfortunate as their abject poverty may be for the hapless north Korean people, to the extent that the north korean leadership is desperate for an economic turnaround, I believe they may be interested in a trade-off between nuclear capabilities and economic rehabilitation.
It’s hard to imagine that north korea would have accepted the commitment to denuclearization, were it not for their economic crisis. While their nuclear capabilities may be useful as an in-kind insurance policy against external aggression, they’re not only useless in resolving their economic problems but indeed deny the very existence of an economic revival. They know that external assistance massive enough to change their fortune would come only when they abandon their nuclear ambition.
Without the revival of their economy, there’s no future of their regime. It will collapse under the weight of economic failure even with all the nuclear weapons and plutonium they may possess. But by addressing north korea’s security concerns and offering them irresistible security, political and economic incentives that will come to denuclearization, I still see a chance that pyeongyang can be made to live up to their commitments. If north korea can be persuaded to trade their nuclear capabilities in for a security assurance, normalization of bilateral relations with the U.S. plus an attractive economic package, this would be a real bargain for us. Thirdly, China has begun to take the specter of north korea’s nuclear program with the utmost seriousness it deserves.
For the first time, they seem determined to devote the amount of diplomatic capital commensurate with the magnitude of the challenge at hand. They know that good faith effort is not enough to prevent and deter a nuclear domino effect in the region. Irrespective of the amount of diplomatic effort devoted to the denuclearization of north korea, if they fail in this effort, there will be serious consequences for their long-term national security interests. A failure in this effort is sure to make china the biggest loser in the restructuring of the geo-strategic landscape to consequently unfold in our region.
Finally, I must point out the most encouraging shift in U.S. position and policy toward north Korean nuclear issue and the six party talks. From Hanoi summit meeting between presidents bush and roh, I could personally attest to a sense of urgency and political will from the u.s. to give diplomacy a real chance but there are real daunting challenges ahead. Despite all these positive signs, the denuclearization of north korea is still a daunting challenge. There are 108 factors that can spoil a deal: the sequencing of steps to be taken by each side, light water reactors, the uranium enrichment program, verification to name only a few.
Each of these has enough explosive potential to rock the whole boat. On the contrary, there is only one condition that can lead to a deal: agreement by all parties because we operate by the principle that nothing is agreed until everything is agreed. And the distance from the starting point to the final destination of denuclearization is known to all. North korea knows what it takes to get there and how to get there, I think. The benefits and incentives to be provided in return for north korea’s denuclearization are also stipulated in the 919 statement, there’s no secret. But how much north korea gets in each stage of implementation depends on how far they’re willing to go in their denuclearization mileage.
Likewise, how far and how fast north korea can be made to move forward to depends primarily on the extent to which the five other parties are willing to give in return for north korea’s actions. In negotiating the details of each stage of the roadmap, the biggest challenge is how to find the point which balances the conflicting interests and priorities of the major stakeholders with the different pricing systems on the same items in to be included in the package.
In the forthcoming negotiations, each side will be tempted to take more for less and give less for more. Each side will attempt to frontload what they value most in the hands of the other side, while withholding until the last moment those assets which they have in their possession and the other side values most. And at the heart of all these problems, lies the lack of mutual trust between the U.S. and north korea. Between parties which cannot trust each other, a long-term contract is inherently difficult to implement. While a downpayment is necessary to get the whole implementation process started, neither side is wiling to take the risk to make the first move. Where credit cards, promissory notes and checks cannot be accepted, only cash transactions with strict reciprocity are possible. And these constraints will compound the difficulties of negotiations.
The level of mistrust is such that some on the US side would take every North Korean gesture or statement as evidence that pyeongyang has not made a strategic decision to abandon its nuclear ambitions, even if it was intended as part of the game with the objective of strengthening their negotiating leverage. Likewise, north korea would not trust u.s. commitment to a peaceful coexistence and abandonment of what they perceive as a hostile policy toward them until they see specific actions on the ground that can back up the US promise.
I have just given you a flavor of the environment in the context in which I have to operation in order to make progress of the talks. What will it take to make progress? First of all, we need a well-coordinated strategy that can not only outsmart, outwit outmaneuver north korea but one that will not fail to take us to the promised land of denuclearized north korea. The game is not who occupies the moral highground or about who’s wrong and right, we’ll lose even if we’re right if north korea is allowed to get away with nuke weapons. We should avoid overloading the agenda of sixparty talks.
We have already more than enough problems in dealing with the central issue of denuclearization., As the BDA case has amply demonstrated, bringing thorny bilateral issues into the sixparty talks can hold back the denuclearization process out of proportion to the nature of the issue. They should be separated from the sixparty talks proper and, if necessary, addressed in a separate forum, such as bilateral working groups or on the margins of six party talks.
Thirdly, all parities should abstain from any action or insensitive rhetoric that could undermine confidence in and the credibility of the six party talks while they are underway. We should give north korea some confidence that their future lies in complete and irreversible nuclear dismantlement. The naming and shaming of the north korean leadership, condescension, self-righteousness or a vindictive approach would not be conducive to an atmosphere for constructive and productive negotiations. North korea will be tempted to cling more desperately to their nuclear capabilities if their threat perceptions are exacerbated. It does not cost much to impress north korea with small gestures of goodwill. What north korea craves the most is some sort of respect, proper recognition and treating them with some respect will make a world of difference. Fourthly , north korea should stop playing games and demonstrate their genuine commitment to denuclearization by taking bold concrete steps to implement their share of the obligations under the Joint Statement.
How forthcoming and cooperative they are in the next round of the talks will turn out to be the first litmus test of whether their commitment to denuclearization can be trusted or not. Finally, the five other parties should be ready to provide the benefits and incentives needed for steps by north korea toward nuclear dismantlement.
It would be a pity should we miss the rare opportunity to get north korea to move forward in the implementation of the joint statement because we are not ready to provide the requisite incentives for north korea or because we are not ready to share the burden involved. Denuclearization is not a one-way street. North korea stands at a critical juncture in their fate. Their future will be determined largely by the strategic choice they make on what to do with their nuclear program. We sincerely hope north korea will seize this historic opportunity to resolve their existential problems by taking the path to denuclearization.

"Let me introduce myself"

2006-12-12T15:21:00.000-08:00

I'm a news reporter working at MUNHWA BROADCASTING CORP.
And I'm covering South Korea's Ministry of Foleign Affairs and Trade.
My primary concern is 6-party talks to denuclearization of DPRK.

Through this page I want to show you the another aspect of 6-party talks. Because Many media's reposrts wich sourcing U.S. Officals give us only one side of facts or phenomenon.

I know that I'm not good at English, but I hope my writings give you some valuable points.

Could 6-party talks make some progress?

2006-12-11T15:22:00.000-08:00

6-party talks will be started on 18th December. It has taken one year and a month to resume the 6-party talks.

From the 9.19 joint agreement, main obstacle was Banco Delta Asia problem. Pyungyang repeatedly has said that "First, Washington have to lift sanction and then we could join the 6-party talks."

31th October, Chris Hill and Kim gey Gwan, diplomat of DPRK met in China secretly and made breakthrough. That day China released that 6-party talks would be resume.
But we don't konw how could they made an agreement both of them didn't mention about what is the solution of BDA problem.

28-29th November, there was second meeting. Before that day South Korea U.S. and Japan made a kind of joint proposal to DPRK and it contains initial elements that DPRK have to do. On that meeting, I thought that if they couldn't set the date, it means failure of meeting ; In my view, U.S. wanted to get early harvest and without DPRK's promise - they will do some concrete action like stop the nuclear reactor and report about nuclear sites - Washington would not set the date.

Till now, there is no signal that DPRK has answered. But China set the date and other countries agreed to have 6-party talks open on 18th December. How could it be?

Diplomats explained that matter as following.....

1. There was no answer from DPRK, but there is or may be some signal that they don't want to break the round table.
2. It's better to open the talks and leave the momentum live than delay 6-party talks.
3. Bush's government - defeated in the middle vote - wants to make some progress quikly and DPRK - under the UN saction and China's pressure - have to do something.