Special Representative for Korean Peninsula Peace and Security Affairs Head of 6-party talks.
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It’s a great pleasure to speak to such wisemen on subjects of great interest. I don’t think such a gathering can be better timed than now since we have only a few days to go until the next round of 6p talks.
I must say in advance that this isn’t a press conference so I’m ,it’s my understanding that gentlemen’s house rules apply to this session and I hope I will not be quoted out of context.
I’ll give a brief overview of where we stand now, why nkorea clinging on to nuke ambitions, what are challenges ahead, are there still chances for diplomatic resolution and what will it take to make progress at next round of the 6p talks…. There have been many twists and turns in the north korean nuke issue sine the Geneva Agreed Framework fell apart four years ago, culminating in north korea’s nuclear test on oct 9 and adoption of UN security council resolution 1718 two weeks later. The good news is that now that the vicious cycle of negative dynamics surrounding the north Korean nuclear issue has run its course, it’s time to reverse the four-year slide and move forward on the path to denuclearization. As announced by china yesterday, the 6party talks will reconvene and we look forward to some real progress on the implementation of the 919 agreement in the next round of six-party talks.
We’ve seen enough commitments thus far and it’s time to translate them into concrete action. I couldn’t earn my bread for the past 9 months, So I have to make up for the lost bread I had to earn. Let me start with how I see nkorea’s motivations in clinging to its ambitions, what their game plan is. North korea is faced with an existential crisis. It has no allies to rely upon in a time of crisis. While it’s conventional armament becoming obsolete it has no money to compete with the South in a conventional arms race. It sees itself, in my view, as being besieged, squeezed, strangled and cornered by hostile powers while languishing in abject poverty with no end or turnaround in sight. According to own statistics, North Korea’s per capita GDP in 2001 stood at $478, and I’m sure that was based on official exchange rate, which is a small fraction of the black market rate.
It continues to depend on international life-support system and for its very subsistence. And desperately standing on the edge, it’s playing a dangerous survival game. Nuclear capabilities occupy central place in this game. For the north korean leaders, nuclear weapons provide the only deterrent against external threats and thus the ultimate insurance policy for national security in an increasingly hostile world.
And since nuclear capabilities are the only source of leverage in Pyongyang’s hand and given the amount of resources they have invested in them at the expense development, they won’t give them up unless a credible alternative is on offer that can resolve all their existential problems, both security and economic, or their insurance premium becomes more costly than the disaster to be insured against. This means that pyeongyang will resort to all kinds of games they know, they’ve worked before, and that a weak party can play in an unequal bargaining situation with the only superpower on earth.
It will be no surprise if they come up with outrageous demands, taking a maximalist approach, resorting to brinkmanship, salami tactics or any other tactics, if they believe it helps to elicit a alternative insurance policy as good as nuclear weapons. From such behavior, we should guard against jumping to the conclusion that they have no intention of giving up their nuclear ambitions. They have little margin of error in their judgement of action. For North Korea, one wrong step on the way could lead tem down a fatal slippery slope toward their own demise. North Korea believes that they have no remedy if the US backs out of its commitments.
This means that flexibility or a spirit of compromise will be the last thing we can expect from them. The North korean leaders know how weak, isolated and vulnerable their country is despite their nuclear capabilities. And as way of covering up weakness and vulnerability, they would not go out of their way to demonstrate how resolutely they can stand up to outside pressure. I’m inclined to see their missile and nuclear tests as well.
They’ll try to delay nuclear dismantlement until they can trust the US commitment to a peaceful coexistence and they are promised an attractive economic and energy assistance package. At the same time, north korea will be tempted to keep a back door to future proliferation open by maintaining their clandestine uranium enrichment program intact. If the northkorean leadership concludes that a deal they can live with is beyond reach, their likely option would be to hunker down, dig in further, muddle through until after the next presidential election in the U.S. I would not exclude the possibility that they’ll go back to the path of building up their nuclear capabilities, including through the resumption of missile and nuclear testing.
Having given you such a green picture of the situation, u might wonder if there are still chances for diplomatic resolution to the issue? I believe there are some grounds to believe that diplomatic resolution is still possible. First, the options open to north korea are very limited. Another nuclear test will only invite addition Security council sanctions far more biting than those already in place. Although we know how determined and resilient north korea is in standing up to outside pressure, I think it would be extremely difficult for them to survive tightened sanctions they are to face in the event that they opt for another test.
Another cause for cautious hope lies ironically now is north korea’s dire economic situation and inability to jumpstart its economic machine on its own without outside assistance. As unfortunate as their abject poverty may be for the hapless north Korean people, to the extent that the north korean leadership is desperate for an economic turnaround, I believe they may be interested in a trade-off between nuclear capabilities and economic rehabilitation.
It’s hard to imagine that north korea would have accepted the commitment to denuclearization, were it not for their economic crisis. While their nuclear capabilities may be useful as an in-kind insurance policy against external aggression, they’re not only useless in resolving their economic problems but indeed deny the very existence of an economic revival. They know that external assistance massive enough to change their fortune would come only when they abandon their nuclear ambition.
Without the revival of their economy, there’s no future of their regime. It will collapse under the weight of economic failure even with all the nuclear weapons and plutonium they may possess. But by addressing north korea’s security concerns and offering them irresistible security, political and economic incentives that will come to denuclearization, I still see a chance that pyeongyang can be made to live up to their commitments. If north korea can be persuaded to trade their nuclear capabilities in for a security assurance, normalization of bilateral relations with the U.S. plus an attractive economic package, this would be a real bargain for us. Thirdly, China has begun to take the specter of north korea’s nuclear program with the utmost seriousness it deserves.
For the first time, they seem determined to devote the amount of diplomatic capital commensurate with the magnitude of the challenge at hand. They know that good faith effort is not enough to prevent and deter a nuclear domino effect in the region. Irrespective of the amount of diplomatic effort devoted to the denuclearization of north korea, if they fail in this effort, there will be serious consequences for their long-term national security interests. A failure in this effort is sure to make china the biggest loser in the restructuring of the geo-strategic landscape to consequently unfold in our region.
Finally, I must point out the most encouraging shift in U.S. position and policy toward north Korean nuclear issue and the six party talks. From Hanoi summit meeting between presidents bush and roh, I could personally attest to a sense of urgency and political will from the u.s. to give diplomacy a real chance but there are real daunting challenges ahead. Despite all these positive signs, the denuclearization of north korea is still a daunting challenge. There are 108 factors that can spoil a deal: the sequencing of steps to be taken by each side, light water reactors, the uranium enrichment program, verification to name only a few.
Each of these has enough explosive potential to rock the whole boat. On the contrary, there is only one condition that can lead to a deal: agreement by all parties because we operate by the principle that nothing is agreed until everything is agreed. And the distance from the starting point to the final destination of denuclearization is known to all. North korea knows what it takes to get there and how to get there, I think. The benefits and incentives to be provided in return for north korea’s denuclearization are also stipulated in the 919 statement, there’s no secret. But how much north korea gets in each stage of implementation depends on how far they’re willing to go in their denuclearization mileage.
Likewise, how far and how fast north korea can be made to move forward to depends primarily on the extent to which the five other parties are willing to give in return for north korea’s actions. In negotiating the details of each stage of the roadmap, the biggest challenge is how to find the point which balances the conflicting interests and priorities of the major stakeholders with the different pricing systems on the same items in to be included in the package.
In the forthcoming negotiations, each side will be tempted to take more for less and give less for more. Each side will attempt to frontload what they value most in the hands of the other side, while withholding until the last moment those assets which they have in their possession and the other side values most. And at the heart of all these problems, lies the lack of mutual trust between the U.S. and north korea. Between parties which cannot trust each other, a long-term contract is inherently difficult to implement. While a downpayment is necessary to get the whole implementation process started, neither side is wiling to take the risk to make the first move. Where credit cards, promissory notes and checks cannot be accepted, only cash transactions with strict reciprocity are possible. And these constraints will compound the difficulties of negotiations.
The level of mistrust is such that some on the US side would take every North Korean gesture or statement as evidence that pyeongyang has not made a strategic decision to abandon its nuclear ambitions, even if it was intended as part of the game with the objective of strengthening their negotiating leverage. Likewise, north korea would not trust u.s. commitment to a peaceful coexistence and abandonment of what they perceive as a hostile policy toward them until they see specific actions on the ground that can back up the US promise.
I have just given you a flavor of the environment in the context in which I have to operation in order to make progress of the talks. What will it take to make progress? First of all, we need a well-coordinated strategy that can not only outsmart, outwit outmaneuver north korea but one that will not fail to take us to the promised land of denuclearized north korea. The game is not who occupies the moral highground or about who’s wrong and right, we’ll lose even if we’re right if north korea is allowed to get away with nuke weapons. We should avoid overloading the agenda of sixparty talks.
We have already more than enough problems in dealing with the central issue of denuclearization., As the BDA case has amply demonstrated, bringing thorny bilateral issues into the sixparty talks can hold back the denuclearization process out of proportion to the nature of the issue. They should be separated from the sixparty talks proper and, if necessary, addressed in a separate forum, such as bilateral working groups or on the margins of six party talks.
Thirdly, all parities should abstain from any action or insensitive rhetoric that could undermine confidence in and the credibility of the six party talks while they are underway. We should give north korea some confidence that their future lies in complete and irreversible nuclear dismantlement. The naming and shaming of the north korean leadership, condescension, self-righteousness or a vindictive approach would not be conducive to an atmosphere for constructive and productive negotiations. North korea will be tempted to cling more desperately to their nuclear capabilities if their threat perceptions are exacerbated. It does not cost much to impress north korea with small gestures of goodwill. What north korea craves the most is some sort of respect, proper recognition and treating them with some respect will make a world of difference. Fourthly , north korea should stop playing games and demonstrate their genuine commitment to denuclearization by taking bold concrete steps to implement their share of the obligations under the Joint Statement.
How forthcoming and cooperative they are in the next round of the talks will turn out to be the first litmus test of whether their commitment to denuclearization can be trusted or not. Finally, the five other parties should be ready to provide the benefits and incentives needed for steps by north korea toward nuclear dismantlement.
It would be a pity should we miss the rare opportunity to get north korea to move forward in the implementation of the joint statement because we are not ready to provide the requisite incentives for north korea or because we are not ready to share the burden involved. Denuclearization is not a one-way street. North korea stands at a critical juncture in their fate. Their future will be determined largely by the strategic choice they make on what to do with their nuclear program. We sincerely hope north korea will seize this historic opportunity to resolve their existential problems by taking the path to denuclearization.
